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Resumo 
O disposicionalismo sofisticado propõe uma redução naturalista do conteúdo mental sustentando 
que o conteúdo semântico de um símbolo mental é determinado a partir das causas da ocorrência 
deste símbolo sob condições ideais, i.e., condições sob as quais apenas o referente do símbolo pode 
causar a sua ocorrência. Contudo, Paul Boghossian desenvolveu a objeção da não-limitação para 
demonstrar que não é possível especificar estas condições ideais em termos não-semânticos, o que 
invibiliazaria a redução naturalista do conteúdo proposta pelo disposicionalismo sofisticado. Meu 
objetivo neste artigo é argumentar que a objeção da não-limitação é falha. 
Abstract 
Sophisticated dispositionalism proposes a naturalist reduction of mental content by claiming that 
the semantic content of a mental symbol is determined by the causes of the occurrence of this 
symbol under ideal conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause 
its tokening. However, Paul Boghossian developed the open-endedness objection in order to show 
that it is not possible to specify these ideal conditions in non-semantic terms, entailing that the 
naturalist reduction of mental content proposed by sophisticated dispositionalism is not viable. My 
goal in this paper is to argue that the open-endedness objection is flawed. 
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 John believes that this is a horse. This is a case in which a mental state has a 
determinate content, i.e., the belief that this is a horse. But in virtue of what does a mental 
state have a certain content? This is the problem of content determination. A naturalist 
response to it consists in specifying a natural fact in virtue of which a mental state has a 
determinate content. Among naturalist theories of content, causal theories try to solve this 
problem by appealing to the causes of a token of a mental representation. The starting 
point of causal theories is that the content of a mental representation is dog because dogs 
cause its tokening. Thus, the content of John's belief is this is a horse because a horse caused 
its tokening. Causal theories of content state that a mental state has a determinate content 
in virtue of causal links between this state and what it represents. 
 Although attractive, causal theories are threatened by a serious problem. Consider 
the content of a given mental symbol tokened in John, HORSE. The crude causal theory 
states that (CCT) The content of HORSE is horse if and only if it is a law that horses cause 
tokenings of HORSE.2 
 Another way of stating it is saying that the content of HORSE is horseiff the agent is 
disposed to apply HORSE only to horses. To say that sugar is disposed to dissolve in water 
is basically to say that it is a law that if sugar is placed in water, it will dissolve. Thus, (CCT) 
is avariation of a dispositionalist theory of content. But is (CCT) viable? 
 The problem is that (CCT) excludes the possibility of error. It doesn't allow John to 
have atokening of a symbol with content horse that was not caused by a horse. If it is a law 
that horsescause a tokening of HORSE, then horses cannot fail to cause tokenings of 
HORSE. But the possibility of representation of a horse presupposes the possibility of its 
false representation. Under certain adverse conditions it is certainly a law that John would 
have a tokening of this symbol inspite of not being presented with a horse. There are 
always conditions sufficiently unfavorable thatwould make John misidentify a given item. 
 Assume that it is a law that horses in sunny days cause John to token HORSE. But 
it is also a law that cows in dark nights cause John to token HORSE. In cases like these, we 
are prone to say that the content of HORSE is horse and that what happened in the first 
case was a true representation and in the second case was a false representation. However, 
(CCT) implies that nomis representation has occurred. Since both horses in sunny days and 
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Thus, thetokening of HORSE is assumed to be a token of an item in the Language of Thought. 
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cows in dark nights cause the tokening of HORSE, (CCT) entails that the content of 
HORSE is horse or cow. (CCT) implies that cows in dark nights and horses in sunny days do 
belong to the extension of HORSE because there is a nomic regularity between the 
tokening of HORSE and the presence of horses in sunny days as well as between the 
tokening of HORSE and the presence of cows in dark nights. (CCT) is unacceptable 
because it doesn't determine the correct extension of a mental symbol, it entails that insofar 
as there is a nomic regularity between an item and the tokening of a mental symbol, this 
item is included in the extension of that symbol. But the false representation occurs 
precisely when a symbolis applied to an item that is not included in its extension. This is 
the problem of misrepresentation: how is it possible for a causal theory of content not to 
exclude the possibility of false representation? A common strategy is to refine (CCT) in 
such a way that the content of a symbol is determined by the causes of its tokening in ideal 
conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause its 
tokening. However, when the conditions are not ideal, the tokening of a symbol can be 
caused by something that is not itsreferent and so the possibility of a false representation is 
open. In an ideal situation, the tokening ofa symbol covaries with the presence of its 
referent. I will call this theory “sophisticated dispositionalism”3. 
(SD) The content of HORSE is horse if and only if it is a law that under ideal conditions C 
horses cause tokenings of HORSE.  
What are the perspectives of (SD) to solve the problem of misrepresentation? Since we are 
looking for a naturalist reduction of content, the ideal conditions C have to be specifiable 
in non semantic terms. There are various proposals of naturalistic specification of C 
available, in particular teleological ones. Teleological specifications of C identify the ideal 
situation with the situation where the producer system of the mental symbol is performing 
its function, i.e., is functioning properly. For instance, Dretske proposed a teleological 
specification of C in terms of the functions acquired by the producer system of the mental 
symbol through a learning process4. But is it really possible to make a specification of C 
without use of any semantic notion? Boghossian maintains that it is not5. He argues not 
only that the available proposals of naturalist specification of C are flawed, but that there 
are principled reasons to conclude that no form of sophisticated dispositionalism could 
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ever specify in non semantic terms a situation in which only the referent of a mental 
symbol can cause its tokening. 
Boghossian's objection to sophisticated dispositionalism focuses on the holistic 
character of the process which fixes beliefs, “belief-holism”. According to belief-holism, 
under normal circumstances belief fixation is mediated by background theory, i.e., by the 
beliefs that the agent has. What contents an agent is prepared to assent to depends upon on 
what other contents that agent is prepared to assent to. Boghossian maintains that this 
dependence is arbitrarily robust – “just about any stimulus can cause just about any belief, 
given a suitably mediating set of background assumptions”6. In light of this, consider these 
examples. John may come to believe “this is a horse” as a result of seeing a cow because he 
believes in the belief Bel¹ = “the only animals in the vicinity are horses”. John may also 
come to believe “this is a horse” although he is in front of a cow because he believes in the 
beliefs contained in the cluster of beliefs Bel² = {“whatever the Pope says is true”, “the 
Pope said that this is a horse”}. And so on, where Beli = {Bel1, Bel2, Bel3...} is the cluster 
of background beliefs capable of mediating the transition from a stimulus of a non-horse to 
the fixation of the belief “this is a horse”. Thus, this belief can be caused by a cow in any of 
an indefinite number of ways, corresponding to the potentially indefinite number of beliefs 
which could mediate this transition. 
Belief-holism, thus, seems uncontentious. But what are the implications of it to the 
viability of a naturalist specification of the ideal situation? The sophisticated dispositionalist 
has to specify, without use of any semantic notion, a situation under which it is a law that 
the tokening of a mental symbol covaries with the presence of its referent. But belief-
holism implies that the agent will be disposed to believe this is a horse in respect of an 
indefinite number of non horses, provided that the appropriate background beliefs are 
present. In light of this, Boghossiandefends that a naturalist specification of this situation is 
in principle impossible. But for whatreasons? Exactly how many reasons Boghossian 
provides for it is controversial. Nonetheless, in what follows I will evaluate the plausibility 
of one of these reasons which I will call, following Alexander Miller, “the open-endedness 
objection”7. My purpose on this essay is to argue that thisobjection fails to demonstrate the 
impossibility of a naturalist specification of the ideal situation. 
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There is a potential infinity of beliefs Beli that could mediate the transition from a 
non horse to the fixation of the belief “this is a horse”. Thus, in order to guarantee the co 
variation between the token of HORSE and the presence of its referent in the ideal 
situation C, the naturalistic specification of C should exclude in this situation all beliefs Beli. 
The core of the open-endedness objection is that no naturalist specification of the ideal 
situation can guarantee the absence of a potentially infinite number of beliefs because only 
a specification that appeals to semantic notions can guarantee the absence of a potentially 
infinite number of items in virtue of their propositional content. The open-endedness 
objection simply takes it to be evident that any naturalistic specification of C lacks this 
capacity. The assessment of its plausibility should be made, therefore, through this 
question: can the naturalist specification of a situation assure the exclusion of each belief 
included in a potentially infinite set of beliefs? I will defend that there is no principled 
reason to determine that no naturalistic specification can have this consequence. At most, 
we can determine whether or not a particular proposal of a naturalist specification of C 
achieves this result. Only through an individual assessment of each proposal is it possible 
to determine if there is an available naturalists pecification which assures the absence of the 
potentially infinite number of beliefs Beli. 
Let's begin this investigation taking as point of departure this simple question: is the 
naturalist specification of C capable of assuring the exclusion of the beliefs included in the 
finite set BelA = {Bel1, Bel2}? Suppose that in order to exist a covariation between 
HORSE and horses, it is enough to exclude the cluster of beliefs in BelA. Thus, how is it 
possible to guarantee in a naturalist way that both Bel1 and Bel2 will be absent in C? 
Obviously, it can't be done through conditions like “S should not believe that the only 
animals in the vicinity are horses” (in order to exclude Bel1) or “S should not believe in 
everything that the pope says” (in order to exclude Bel2), since both conditions appeal to 
semantics notions. So the only way to achieve this result is to guarantee that C doesn't 
satisfy the natural conditions under which the agent is capable of acquiringBel¹ or Bel². But 
how can it be done? 
Given the fact that it is problematic to specify natural conditions under which 
certain beliefs are absent and that what is relevant to the success of the open-endedness 
objection is that the set of cluster of beliefs capable of interfering in the co variation 
between the token of a symbol and the presence of its referent is potentially infinite, 
suppose that it is possible to specify naturalistically the conditions in which Bel¹ and Bel² 
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are absent and let's call them CN. Would it be possible to specify natural conditions CN*, 
extendible from CN, that guarantee the absence of all beliefs in the set BelB = {Bel1, Bel2, 
Bel3}? Since the difference between BelA and BelB is Bel3, it seems to be possible. But then 
would it be possible to specify natural conditions CN** extendible from CN*that guarantee 
the absence of all beliefs of the set BelC = {Bel1, Bel2, Bel3, Bel4}? Since the difference 
between BelB and BelC is Bel4, it also seems to be possible. What this exercise shows is that 
given the fact that natural conditions in order to exclude certain beliefs are available, it 
seems possible to extend these conditions in order to exclude other beliefs and so on. 
Prima facie, this is a process without a predetermined limit. In light of this, is it possible to 
extend CN enough in order to exclude all beliefs in the potentially infinite set Beli = {Bel1, 
Bel2, Bel3...}? Note that the objection of open-endedness presupposes that an extension of 
this nature is in principle not possible. But what reasons Boghossian provides to support 
this claim? None, he simply takes it for granted. Unfortunately this is not a legitimate 
move. 
First of all, at no time does Boghossian clearly maintain that Beli is infinite. What he 
repeatedly claims is that it is potentially infinite, a set that doesn't have a predetermined 
number of members. But it doesn't follow from the fact that a set doesn't have a 
predetermined limit that it is an infinite set; to assume that is to incur in a conceptual 
confusion. A set without a predetermined limit is a set with an indefinitely large number of 
members and it is possible that we don't know if that set is finite or infinite. In case of Beli, 
apparently what is occurring is that whenever we think we have already conceived all 
beliefs capable of interfering in the co variation between HORSE and horses, if we persist 
in our search we will always be able to conceive a belief that previously was not conceived, 
discovering thereby a new belief that is a member of Beli. Nonetheless, it doesn't follow 
from this that Beli is infinite8. After all, it is possible that we take this set as potentially 
infinite in virtue of an epistemic limitation – it is possible that in the course of the 
investigation we discover that it is a finite and conceivable set or that it is finite but so large 
that our cognitive system is incapable of grasping it. Furthermore, in order to verify that a 
given set is infinite, a demonstration of its infinity is required. However, in case of Beli not 
demonstration of this kind is available. In short, we simply don't know if Beli is finite or 
infinite, all that we know is that Beli is a set with an indefinitely large number of members. 
                                                          
8It is not because we are always capable of conceiving a new member of a given set that this set is 
infinite. We arecertainly capable of continuously conceiving a new member of the set of atoms of 
the sun that until then was notconceived, but obviously this set is finite. 
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If the open-endedness objection assumes that it is impossible to extend CN 
sufficiently in order to exclude the totality of beliefs in Beli in virtue of the fact that this is 
an infinite set, this is an unjustifiable supposition because we don't know if Beli is infinite. 
However, since what this objection seems to assume is that from the fact that Beli is a 
potentially infinite set it follows that it is impossible to extend sufficiently CN in order to 
exclude all beliefs in Beli, what is lacking here is the justification of the supposition that 
natural conditions are not able to exclude an indefinitely large number of beliefs, a problem 
aggravated by the fact that it is certainly less plausible that its hould be impossible for 
natural conditions to exclude an indefinitely large number of beliefs than for them to 
exclude an infinite number of beliefs. Given that Boghossian doesn't offer any argument to 
support this assumption, there is no reason to conclude that it is impossible to extend CN 
in order to exclude all beliefs Beli in C. 
We can only know if the natural conditions to exclude the beliefs in the potentially 
infinite set Beli are extendible from the natural conditions to exclude the beliefs in the finite 
set BelA if weal ready know which natural conditions are able to exclude the beliefs in BelA. 
Evidently, an evaluation of this nature can only be made through an analysis of each 
available proposal regarding the natural conditions that guarantee the absence of Bel1 and 
Bel2. Given that Boghossian doesn't do that, there is no guarantee of the impossibility of 
this extension. Thus, the objection of open-endedness fails to demonstrate that there is no 
naturalistically specifiable situation in which the totality of beliefs able to make non horses 
cause the tokening of horse is absent. Maybe the fact that this set is potentially infinite 
complicates the implementation of the dispositionalist project, but this difficulty doesn't 
force us to conclude that in principle this project is doomed to fail. 
The comparison with the analysis of other dispositional properties in natural 
science provides another reason to conclude that the potential infinity of Beli do not 
impose an insuperable problem to the dispositionalist. In many areas of natural science that 
use ceteris paribus clauses, the set of factors that inhibit the manifestation of a given 
disposition is also potentially infinite. Consider the solubility of water. X is soluble in water 
when in certain circumstances C',X would dissolve if immersed in a sufficient quantity of 
water. Notwithstanding, as C.B. Martin argues9,there is a potential infinity of factors able to 
inhibit the solubility of x in water. For instance, common salt is not soluble in water if the 
water is already saturated or if it is surrounded by a strong electromagnetic field. But 
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nobody would claim that the salt isn't water soluble, only that it is not possible to fully 
carry out an analysis of the dispositional property of solubility. Perhaps Boghossian is right 
in maintaining that sophisticated dispositionalism is doomed to fail because there is no non 
semantic specification of a situation in which only the referent of a mental symbol can 
cause its tokening. But the reason for this failure is not the one indicated by the open-
endedness objection. 
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